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Abstract. The principle of fair administration of justice requires that formal restrictions on 
initiating procedures before courts correspond to the right to access to a court. Based on the 
rule of law–Community law shall ensure that its provisions on the administration of justice 
are in accord with the fundamental law requirements established in Community law. The 
provisions on intervention before Community courts contain certain restraints on access to a 
court that are worth scrutinising on a fundamental right basis. The aim of the paper is threefold. 
First, it wishes to recover the jurisprudence of Community courts interpreting the conditions of 
intervention. Second, it attempts to reveal the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
courts on access to justice with respect to formal restrictions. Third, it essays to implement the 
access to court test on the restraints of access to justice in intervention.   
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Introduction 
 
Formal restrictions on initiating procedures before Community courts have 
always been in the centre of debate in Community law. The locus standi condi-
tions of annulment actions under Art. 230 EC attracted much of attention in 
the past mainly due to the notoriously strict interpretation on the postulate of 
individual concern anchored by the European Court of Justice. The ever since 
growing importance of fundamental rights in Community law established a new 
source of standards not only set against the legal provisions of the Member States 
but against the Community legal system. It became evident that the Community 
provisions restricting access to justice cannot avoid the binding criteria of 
fundamental rights.  
 The expressed correspondence of the Community system of fundamental 
rights protection to the law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) premised that the two separate orders of European human rights’ 
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protection apply similar elements when determining the limits of a basic right. 
The in Community law recognised right to effective judicial protection covers the 
right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy as named in the ECHR.  
 The right to access to a court–developed form the right to a fair trial–provides 
that according to the principle of fair administration of justice the formal 
restrictions on the initiation of procedures before a court shall not result in a 
denial of justice. Furthermore, it requires the restrictions to be supported by a 
proportionate legitimate interest.  
 The intervention before a court allows the interveners to support the parties 
in a pending procedure to attain the form of order sought. This way the interests 
can be represented before a court without launching a separate action which 
in some circumstances may be extensively difficult. It follows that the rules 
governing intervention that establish formal restrictions on applying for a leave 
to intervene before Community courts shall also correspond to the conditions 
mounted by the right to access to a court.    
 
 
How is Intervention Regulated in Community Law? 
 
According to Art. 40 (former 37) of the Statute of the European Court of Justice 
(Statute) in direct actions1 before Community courts the Member States and 
the Community institutions have the right to intervene in any case before the 
Courts. Any other person may intervene in any case except for cases between 
the Member States, between the Community institutions or between the Member 
States and the Community institutions, if the intervener is able to establish an 
interest in the result of the case.  
 Art. 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice2 
provides that either the President of the Court or the Court decides on the 
application for intervention. The application must be presented after six 
weeks of the publication of the original procedure in the Official Journal. An 
application may be accepted after the expiry of the above period, but before the 
opening of the oral procedure. In appeal the intervention is open until one month 
after the publication of the appeal in the Official Journal.3 The intervener shall 
  
 1 The request for a preliminary ruling (Art. 234 EC) can be characterised as an indirect 
action. 
 2 Art. 115 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance contains similar 
provisions. 
 3 Art. 123 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Justice. 
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accept the case as he finds it at the time of his intervention and shall support only 
one of the parties.4  
 Art. 34 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, however, did not apply the limitation based on the types of actions. 
It provided that any natural or legal person in any case before the Court may 
intervene, if the intervener establishes an interest in the result of the case. In 
addition, it limited the intervention to supporting or requesting the rejection of 
the submissions of one of the parties.  
 In preliminary ruling proceedings the possibility of intervention does not 
exist. However, those who have intervened in the proceedings in the national 
court may participate in the procedure before the ECJ. This has been clarified 
by the Court in Biogen v. Smithkline and Beecham Biologicals.5 In this case 
an application to intervene in a preliminary ruling procedure was found 
inadmissible as the Court ruled that the right to intervene before the Court only 
applied “to contentious proceedings before the Court, designed to settle a 
dispute.”6 The Court found that the preliminary ruling procedure was not such 
procedure, as its aim is to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community law 
by ensuring co-operation between the national courts and the ECJ. The Court 
then referred to Art. 20 (now 23) of the Statute governing the participation in 
preliminary ruling cases, which states that “the parties (...) shall be entitled to 
submit statements of the case or written observations to the Court”. The Court 
asserted that the term “parties” referred only to the parties in the procedure 
before the national court. Consequently, a person who has not been granted a 
leave to intervene before the national court is not entitled to submit observations 
in the procedure before the Court. 
 Even tough it is not named intervention, Art. 23 of the Statute orders that in 
cases governed by Art. 234 EC the Member States, the Commission and, where 
appropriate, the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central 
Bank are entitled to make written and oral observations of the case to the Court. 
The last paragraph of the same article provides that in cases with EEA or EFTA 
relevance non-member states are also allowed to submit written or oral obser-
vations of the case to the Court. In spite of the fact that it is clear that this 
intervention-like procedure is justifiable on functional grounds, so that the 
uniform interpretation and application of Community law is observed, in case of 
  
 4 Art. 40 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice. 
 5 C-181/95, Order of the President of the Court of 26 February 1996, Biogen Inc. v. 
Smithkline and Beecham Biologicals SA [1997] ECR 0357. 
 6 Par. 4; the Court also refers to C-6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 614 and C-19/68 De 
Cicco v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1968] ECR 473. 
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a request for preliminary ruling on validity of Community acts it is questionable 
that the lawmaker(s) are able to participate in the procedure, the legal subjects 
of the act in question, however, not. Finally, the legal construction applied in 
preliminary ruling cases may be controversial in cases of a request for a prelimi-
nary ruling on the validity of Community acts, as this question may not be 
assessed in the procedure in the national court, thus the person having interest in 
this matter does not apply to intervene before the national court.7 
 
 
The Intervention of Private Parties in Direct Actions 
 
With the exclusion of certain cases private parties may intervene in cases before 
the Community courts, if they are able to prove sufficient interest in the result 
of the proceedings. It is for the Community courts to decide upon this question, 
which produced a large amount of case-law. The analysis of these cases will 
provide us information to establish the major tendencies on the admissibility of 
applications for intervention by private parties. The cases in which applications 
for intervention the most frequently take place, due to the restrictions in 
Art. 40 of the Statue, are mainly actions for annulments under Art. 230 EC and 
procedures for interim relief. The disputes cover almost all fields of substantive 
Community law from staff cases to competition law. 
 
 
How is the Concept of an Interest in the Result of the Case Interpreted by 
Community Courts? 
 
An important line of interpretation can be outlined from Rijnoudt and Hocken8 
in which a Community official wanted to intervene in an action for annulment of 
salary statements brought by other officials. The CFI ruled that the concept of an 
interest in the result of the case must be interpreted as a direct interest in the 
decision on the claims. The CFI dismissed the application by stating that an 
official who did not bring an action in relation to his own salary statement, 
  
 7 Schermers, H. and Waelbroeck, M.: Judicial Protection in the EU, 6th ed, Kluwer, 
2001, 724, § 1452. 
 8 T-97/92 and T-111/92, Loek Rijnoudt and Michael Hocken v. Commission [1994] ECR 
staff cases. 
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although he could have done so, can only establish an indirect interest in the result 
of the case.9  
 The CFI in Elena Candiotte10 went further and declared that  
 
“an interest in the result of the case within the meaning of the second 
paragraph of Art. 37 of the (...) Statute of the Court of Justice must be under-
stood as a direct, existing interest in the success and failure of the submissions 
which relate specifically to the measure whose annulment or suspension is 
sought.”11  
 
In this case some members of the institutions’ Staff Committee applied to inter-
vene in support of the applicant who sought the annulment of a decision not 
admitting a self-employed artist to the second stage of a competition for select-
ing the works of art to be installed in a new building of a Community institution. 
The CFI found that these persons lacked direct interest in the outcome of the 
case, as they were unable to demonstrate any personal interest in the admission 
of the applicant to the second stage of the competition or to show that their 
position could be affected by the result of the case.  
 In ACAV12 the President of the Fist Chamber of the CFI ordered that the 
concept of an interest in the result of the case must be understood as a direct and 
actual interest in the manner in which applications for forms of order are dealt 
with. In particular, traders established in a Member State have an interest in the 
outcome of the dispute, in so far as the contested measure prevents them form 
carrying on part of their activities and affect their income. Moreover, the court 
concluded that a local or regional body also establishes such interest, if it is able 
to prove that its economic and social structure essentially depends on the sector 
affected by the contested measure, and the contested measure could require a 
conversion plan for the whole area concerned. However, to evade the risk of 
unemployment and loss of business of traders in the area as a favourable result 
to obtain is an interest indirect and remote. In order to prove direct and actual 
interest the local or regional body must show that the economical and social 
structure as a whole is essentially dependent of that sector of activity.   
 
  
 9 This ruling was repeated in an order in the very similar C-76/93 P, Piera Scaramuzza 
v. Commission [1993] ECR I-5715 case. 
 10 T-108/94, Elena Candiotte v. Council [1994] ECR II-0249. 
 11 Par. 5. 
 12 T-138/98, ACAV v. Council [1999] ECR II-1797. 
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A different approach was introduced in Compagnie Maritime Belge13 in which 
the CFI held that an interest in the result of the case was established as the 
contested decision closed the procedure initiated by the Commission following 
the complaints of a trade association, whose members included the companies 
applying to intervene. The court supported its argument by stating that these 
companies participated in the procedure before the Commission by submitting 
written observations and attending at the hearings. This argument was further 
affirmed by the CFI in Eurosport14 in which it stated that an undertaking whose 
complaint caused the proceedings of the Commission to be initiated which was 
concluded by the contested decision has an interest in the result of the case. In 
another case15 the leave to intervene was granted partly on the basis that certain 
interveners took part in the procedure as complainants, in which the contested 
decision was adopted.  
 In Eurosport the CFI found another specific situation in which an interest in 
the outcome of the dispute is established. It declared that an undertaking who 
was the addressee of the contested decision and, as a result, enjoyed an inde-
pendent right of action under Art. 230 EC also possessed such interest without 
the obligation to initiate the action for annulment. This approach was upheld in a 
later case16 in which the Court granted a leave intervene to a company which 
had an independent right to launch an action for annulment against the contested 
regulation under Art. 230 EC, as the company was of direct and individual 
concern of the contested measure. The fact, however, that it did not bring a 
separate action for annulment confined its rights as an intervener to support the 
forms of order sought by the respondent.  
 It is also worth analysing the intervention cases under Art. 34 of the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community as it applies the 
same test of having an interest in the result of the case. In a very early case17 the 
Court decided to examine precisely which provision the interveners had an 
interest in having annulled. The Court concluded that the interveners could only 
prove their interest in the result of the case in relation to a small segment of 
the case. This meant that the Court allowed their intervention to support The 
  
 13 T-24/93 R, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport NV v. Commission [1993] ECR II-
0543.  
 14 T-35/91, Eurosport Consortium v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1359. 
 15 T-395/94 R, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission [1995] ECR II-
0595. 
 16 C-245/95 P, Commission v. NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. [1996] ECR I-
0553. 
 17 C-25/69, The Netherlands v. High Authority of the ECSC.  
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Netherlands to have only a limited part of the contested decision annulled. 
Furthermore, as a condition for intervention in this case the Court examined 
whether the interveners were directly affected by the contested decision.  
In Lemmerz-Werke18 the Court assessed that the intervener must show a 
direct and existing interest in the acceptance by the Court of the submissions 
of one of the parties. The Court rejected the application to intervene because 
the only interest the intervener claimed was in the success of certain of the 
applicants arguments. In British Coal19 the CFI held that the intervention of 
a person showing direct and present interest in the result of the case was 
admissible. On these grounds it ruled that the company which made the complaint 
before the Commission was entitled to intervene, since the application sought 
the annulment of a decision favourable to it. On the other hand a purchaser 
of coal was not granted a leave to intervene in the action for annulment 
initiated by a producer of coal of the Commission’s refusal to reject the comp-
laint, even though the Commission instituted proceedings against both of them 
on the basis of the same complaint, however by reason of different infringe-
ments of Community law, since the infringements were distinct and did not 
share the same legal framework. The President of the Court in National Power20 
ruled in the following way:  
 
“For the purposes of granting leave to intervene, the Community judicature 
ascertains whether those seeking it are directly affected by the contested act 
and whether their interest in the result of the case is established. Similarly, it 
is necessary to establish a direct, existing interest in the grant by the Court of 
the order as sought and not an interest in relation to the pleas in law put 
forward. The interest necessary in this respect must relate not merely to 
abstract legal arguments but to the actual form of order sought by a party in 
the main action.” 
 
Just as in case of the action for annulment under Art. 230 EC21 the Community 
courts developed a separate interpretation of the admissibility conditions of 
  
 18 C-111/63, Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Authority of the ECSC. 
 19 T-367/94, British Coal Corporation v. Commission [1997] ECR II-0469. 
 20 C-151/97 P(I) and C-157/97 P(I), National Power plc and PowerGen plc v. British 
Coal Corp. and Commission [1997] ECR I-3491. 
 21 See cases: C-67/85, C-68/85 and C-70/85, Van der Kooy v. Commission par. 21–24 
[1988] ECR 219; T-585/93, Greenpeace v. Commission par. 59 (and the cited cases) [1995] 
ECR II-2205; T-122/96, Federolio v. Commission [1997] ECR II-1559, T-84/01; T-173/98, 
UPA v. Council par. 47 [1999] ECR II-3357; T-84/01, ACHE v. European Parliament and 
Council par. 25 [2002] ECR II-0099. 
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intervention for (trade)associations. In the Kruidvat case22 the CFI ruled that 
the as FEPD (Fédération Européenne des Parfumeurs Détaillants) represented a 
large number of undertakings in the sector. Since its objective was to protect 
their interests in particular in relation to the institutions of the European Union, 
it had an interest to intervene in a case in which the operation of selective 
distribution systems in the field of de luxe cosmetics was at stake. In Atlantic 
Container23 the intervention was found admissible, as it was ascertained that the 
immediate application of the contested measure was likely, prima facie, to affect 
the activities of the members of the intervening trade associations. The President 
of the Court in Pharos24 granted a leave to intervene an association comprising 
of national associations from the animal health industry in Europe and manu-
facturers of animal health products, since the outcome of the case was of direct 
concern to the members of this association. In another two cases25 the interven-
tion of representative associations was dependent on whether their objective 
was to protect the interest of their members in cases dealing with questions of 
principle liable to affect their members.  
 The specific nature of the AAC case26 lies in the fact that the CFI decided 
upon the intervention on the basis of the termination of the interest in the result 
of the case. Casillo Grani and Italigrani were granted a leave to intervene 
in the procedure. Later, however, the lawyer of Casillo Grani submitted a 
declaration to the CFI that Casillo Grani was in liquidation. The CFI ruled that 
in spite of the fact that Casillo Grani’s interest in the case was constituted by 
the fact that it was in competition with the company in receipt of the aid in 
question in the proceedings, this interest no longer existed as Casillo Grani 
was in liquidation. Moreover, the CFI added that because of the fact that the 
aid had not yet been paid to the recipient, the competitive position of Cassilo 
Grani could not have been affected before it was declared to be in liquidation. 
  
  
 22 T-87/92, Kruidvat BVBA v. Commission [1993] ECR II-1375. 
 23 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v. Commission... op. cit. 
 24 C-151/98 P(I), Pharos SA v. Commission [1999] ECR I-8157. 
 25 Orders in C-151/97 P(I) and C-157/97 P(I), National Power plc and PowerGen plc v. 
British Coal Corp. and Commission... op. cit. par. 66 and T-13/99 R Pfizer Animal Health SA 
v. Council par. 15 (not published in ECR). 
 26 T-442/93, Association des Amidonneries de Céréales de la CEE and Others v. 
Commission [1995] ECR II-1329. 
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Summary 
 
Generally speaking the Community courts interpret the condition of an interest in 
the result of the case under Art. 40 of the Statute as a direct and actual (existing, 
present) interest in the forms of orders sought by one of the parties. The decisions 
of the courts in this matter are based on the submissions of the prospective 
interveners and/or on the facts of the case. In certain cases the courts see the 
interest in the result of the case established, if the administrative procedure 
preceding the procedure in the court was instrumented on the basis of the 
complaint of the intervener and/or the intervener took part in the administrative 
procedure. In (trade)association cases the intervener’s aim to protect its 
members proves to be sufficient to fulfil the condition provided in Art. 40 
of the Statute. In case of local or regional bodies such interest is established, if 
they are able to prove that their economic and social structure essentially 
depends on the sector affected by the contested measure. One specific case when 
the interest in the result of the case is established, when the intervener has the 
right to initiate an independent action for annulment under Art. 230 EC against 
the contested measure in the main procedure. This may seem to be overtly 
restrictive, as the courts examine, whether the standing conditions of Art. 230 (4) 
EC are fulfilled, however, the Community courts only applied this construction, 
when the intervener’s action for annulment would have been found admissible. 
In some cases the Community courts required the prospective interveners to 
prove that the contested measure in the main procedure directly affected them. 
Finally, the power of Community courts to decide upon the admissibility of 
applications to intervene not only allows them to assign the intervention in 
support of one of the parties, but the are able restrict the intervention to certain 
claims of the supported party on the basis of the interest in the result of the case. 
  
 
Are There Cases of Specific Nature? 
 
The special circumstances in these cases allow to treat them separately from 
the main line of cases since considerations other than the conditions in the 
Statute may be discovered to be taken account of. In both Roquette Frères and 
Maizena27 the European Parliament applied to intervene in the cases. The 
Council argued, however, that the right to intervene was to be equated with the 
right of action, in particular the initiation of an action for annulment and the 
  
 27 C-138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council [1980] ECR 3333 and C-139/79, Maizena 
GmbH v. Council [1980] ECR 3393. 
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submission of observations in a preliminary ruling procedure, which the 
Parliament lacked. Furthermore, the Council asserted that the Parliament’s right 
to intervene would depend upon the existence of a legal interest. The Court, 
however, rejected the Council’s submissions and stated that such restrictions 
would adversely affect the institutional position of the Parliament and would be 
incompatible with Art. 37 (now 40) of the Statute. 
 The Staff Committee of the European Parliament applied to intervene in the 
Lassalle28 case on the grounds that the word “person” in Art. 37 (now 40) of the 
Statute extend the right to intervene to all parties representing an organised 
focus of legitimate interests. The Court, on the contrary, ruled that there was no 
reason to believe that the treatymakers intended to extend the right to intervene 
to entities lacking legal personality or even its basic aspects. The Court pointed 
out that the independence, the responsibility and the functions of a body or organ 
would be decisive in ascertaining its capacity to bring legal proceedings, in 
particular to intervene in a case. 
 The intervention is a major instrument in the hands of public interest 
litigation, however, the restrictions on the type of actions in Art. 40 of the Statue 
largely limit its elbow-room. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of public 
interest litigation in intervention cases. In the Ford case29 the BEUC (Bureau 
Européen des Union Consummateurs), an international consumer protection 
organisation incorporated under Belgian law was granted a leave to intervene 
on grounds that the procedure of the Commission had originated from its 
complaints. The BEUC applied to intervene in a very similar procedure for 
interim relief in the Peugeot case.30 The Unione Nazionale Consumatori applied 
for a leave to intervene in support of the Commission against the companies 
allegedly violating the Community competition rules in Suiker Unie.31 In AM&S32 
the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the EC applied to 
intervene in order to support the protection of the right to confidential communi-
cation between lawyer and client. The IPO (Intellectual Property Owners 
Association) sought to intervene in the Magill case,33 in which the relationship 
between intellectual property and competition law was discussed. 
  
 28 C-15/63, M. Claude Lassalle v. European Parliament ??ECR?? 
 29 C-228 and 229/82, Ford v. Commission [1982] ECR 3091. 
 30 T-23/90 R, Peugeot v. Commission [1990] ECR II-195. 
 31 C-40-48/73 and C-50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Suiker Unie v. Commission 
[1975] ECR 1663. 
 32 C-155/79, AM&S Europe v. Commission [1982] ECR 1575. 
 33 C-241/91 P and 242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-0743. 
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 The overtly restrictive nature34 of the limitation on the types of actions in 
Art. 40 of the Statue is exposed in a case, in which various Italian car importers 
applied to intervene in the dispute between the Commission and Italy.35 Italy was 
found to be in breach of Community law as it introduced new administrative 
requirements involving the production of documents necessary for parallel 
import of vehicles. Since Art. 40 of the Statute excludes the intervention of 
natural or legal persons in cases between a Member State and a Community 
institution, the undertakings involved in the imports of vehicles could not 
represent their presumably direct interest in the case by supporting one of the 
parties. The approach to this restrictive rule was, however, given a peculiar twist 
in the Italy and Sardegna Lines case.36 Two actions for annulment were initiated 
side by side against the Commission on the same basis. In the one case launched 
by Sardegna Lines the CFI declined its jurisdiction in order to enable the ECJ to 
hear the claim. The case was registered anew and was joined with the other 
action instituted by Italy. This meant that Sardegna Lines was able to participate 
in a dispute between a Member State and a Community Institution, which 
would have been impossible under Art. 40 of the Statute, if the two actions had 
not been joined.    
 
 
Some Recent Cases on Intervention 
 
In Pescadores37 the CFI ruled that an interest in the result of the case meant a 
direct and present interest in the decision on the claims. The CFI added that it 
must ascertain that the intervener is directly affected by the measure and that his 
interest in the result of the case is certain. It continued that an application to 
intervene by a local or regional body of a Member State must be dismissed, if it 
has not been proven that the economic and social structure of that entity depends 
primarily on the given economic sector. The Autoritá Portuale di Ancona (APA) 
applied for a leave to intervene in the case Coe Clerici,38 in which the applicant 
sought the annulment of a Commission letter refusing to act on the applicant’s 
complaint against the bye-law of governing the carrying on of self-handling 
  
 34 Schermers–Waelbroeck: Judicial Protection in the EU... op. cit. 718, § 1443. 
 35 C-154/85 R, Commission v. Italy [1985] ECR 1753. 
 36 C-15/98 and C-105/99, Italy and Sardegna Lines v. Commission [2000] ECR I-8855. 
 37 T-54/00 R, Federacion de Cofradías de Pescadores de Guipuzcoa, Federacion de 
Cofradías de Pescadores de Vizcaya, Federacion de Cofradías de Pescadores de Cantabria 
and others v. Council [2000] ECR II-2875. 
 38 T-52/00, Coe Clerici Logistics Spa v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2553. 
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operations in the Port of Ancona passed by APA. The CFI ordered that in its 
capacity as a party, against who the applicant’s complaint was addressed, APA 
has a direct and existing interest in the grant of the order sought. In Comafrica 
Dole39 the court declared that it is settled case law that the interest in the result 
of the case must be understood as a direct and existing interest in the grant of 
the order sought. The CFI ordered that in spite of the fact that the applicant 
established a certain interest in the result of the case, the application must be 
dismissed, as the applicant did not prove the existence of a direct and existing 
interest in the grant of the claims.  
 In Poste Italiana40 the CFI examined the admissibility of applications to inter-
vene by Recapitalia Consorzio Italiano delle Agenzie di Recapito Licenziatarie 
del Ministerio delle Comunicazioni and by the TNT Post Group. With respect to 
the application of Recapitalia Consorzio the CFI ordered that representative 
associations, whose object is to protect their members in cases raising questions 
of principle liable to affect those members are allowed to intervene. The CFI 
also pointed out that the member undertakings of Recapitalia Consorzio lodged 
complaints against Italy in the Commission in connection with the activity of 
Poste Italia. Furthermore, these members of Recapitalia Consorzio are able to 
establish interest in the result of the case, as their functioning depends on the 
final decision in the main proceedings. Concerning the application by the TNT 
Post Group the President of the CFI granted a leave to intervene, since the final 
order in the main procedure would determine whether it could continue its 
business activity. In addition, the complaint lodged by the TNT Post Group in 
the Commission also establishes an interest in the result of the case. 
 The President of the CFI in IMS Health41 decided that the interest in the 
result of the case of the three interveners was established, as NDC was the 
complainant in the procedure before the Commission, NDC Health was directly 
involved in the copyright infringement proceedings brought by IMS Health in 
Germany and AzyX was not merely IMS Health’s only other current competitor 
on the relevant market, but it was also closely associated with the investigation 
of the Commission. In the NFV case42 the CFI acknowledged the right of CEF 
City and CEF Holdings to intervene on the basis of Art. 37 (now 40) of the 
Statute, as they had lodged a complaint before the Commission and, thereafter, 
participated in the procedure. Furthermore, the CFI added that the outcome 
  
 39 T-139/01, Comafrica Dole v. Commission [2002] ECR II-0799. 
 40 T-53/01 R, Poste Italiana v. Commission [2001] ECR II-1479. 
 41 T-184/01 R, IMS Health Inc. v. Commission [2001] ECR II-3193. 
 42 T-5/00 R, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektro-
technisch Gebied v. Commission [2000] ECR 4121. 
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of the procedure could adversely affect the interests of CEF City and CEF 
Holdings. 
 In the PVC cases43 the Court ruled on a specific aspect of the intervener’s 
interest in the result of the case. In all of these cases DSM applied to intervene 
in support of the applicants who sought the annulment of the judgements of 
the CFI denying the annulment of the Polypropylene Decision of the Commission.44 
In the mean time, the Court delivered its PVC judgement45 on an appeal annulling 
a CFI judgement denying the annulment of the Polypropylene Decision. 
Following, the Court examined whether its PVC judgement dissolved the 
interest of DSM in the result of all the cases. The Court found that the interest of 
DSM did not die on delivery of the PVC judgement of the Court of Justice and 
held that the defects found by this judgement were not such as to warrant 
treating the decision challenged in the PVC cases as non-existent. The PVC 
judgement did not establish the non-existence of the Polypropylene Decision, 
and, therefore, it did not bring the interest of DSM in obtaining a finding of such 
non-existence to an end. The Court also asserted in these cases that the fact that 
the Court, by a previous order, had allowed intervention in support of the 
form of order sought by a party does not preclude a fresh examination of the 
admissibility of the intervention. 
 
Summary 
 
These cases highlight that the Community courts interpret the condition of an 
interest in the result of the case as a direct and present interest. However, they 
also require the interveners to prove that the contested measure in the main 
procedure affected them directly. Furthermore, a new element appears in the 
test: the intervener must establish a certain interest in the result of the case. 
Moreover, it is stated that an interest in the result of the case is established, if the 
orders sought could adversely affect the interest or the functioning of the inter-
vener. In other cases the direct and existing interest was also established by 
interveners, if the administrative procedure preceding the procedure in the court 
was instrumented on the basis of the complaint of the intervener, and/or the 
  
 43 T-199/92 P, Hüls AG v. Commission [1999] ECR II-4287; T-200/92 P, ICI v. 
Commission [1999] ECR II-4399; T-227/92 P, Hoechst AG v. Commission [1999] ECR II-
4443; T-234/92 P, Shell v. Commission [1999] ECR II-4501; T-235/92 P Montecatini v. 
Commission [1999] ECR II-4539; T-242/92 P; T-245/92 P, Chemie Linz v. Commission 
[1999] ECR II-4643. 
 44 Commission Decision 86/398/EEC of 23 April 1986, OJ L 230 , 18/08/1986, 1–66. 
 45 C-137/92 P, Commission v. BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555. 
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intervener took part in the administrative procedure, or the intervener was 
closely associated with the administrative procedure. The application to inter-
vene of a local or regional body is admissible, if their economic and social 
structure essentially depends on the sector affected by the contested measure. In 
association cases the protection of members’ rights is sufficient to prove to have 
a leave to intervene granted.  
  
 
The Concept of the Right to Effective Judicial Protection in Community 
Law 
 
Procedural rights, such as the right to effective judicial protection, are central to 
the principle of rule of law,46 as they ensure the fair administration of justice.47 
Community law is based on the rule of law,48 thus it ensures that the right to 
effective judicial protection is observed. Moreover, it is settled case law that 
fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of Community 
law inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and 
by the international treaties on the protection of human rights signed by the 
Member States.49 It follows that the right to effective judicial protection is a 
general principle of Community law. 
 
The principle of effective judicial protection was explicitly established in 
Community law in cases Johnston and Heylens.50 In its UPA judgement51 the 
Court stated that the  
  
 46 Harlow, C.: Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European Convent and the European 
Union, 188, in Alston, P.: The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 1999.  
 47 Jacobs, F.: The European Convention on Human Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1996. 125. 
 48 C-294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament par.23 [1986] ECR 1339. 
 49 C-29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; C-11/70, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratselle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; C-
4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491; C-36/75, Rutili v. Ministre de l’Interieur [1975] 
ECR 1219. 
 50 C-222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary par. 18 
[1986] ECR 1651; C-222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens [1987] ECR 4097; see also: C-257/85, 
C. Dufay v. European Parliament [1987] ECR 1561; C-314/91, Weber v. Parliament [1993] 
ECR I-0643; C-12/95 P, TRAMASA v. Commission [1995] ECR I-0467; C-282/95 P, Guérin 
Automobiles v. Commission [1997] ECR I-1503; T-107/94, Christina Kik v. Council [1995] 
ECR I-1717; C-97/91 Borelli v. Commission [1992] ECR I-6313. 
 51 C-50/00 P, UPA v. Council par. 39 [2002] ECR I-6677. 
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“right to such protection is one of the general principles of law stemming 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That right 
has also been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”  
 
The CFI in Jégo-Quéré52 concluded that  
 
“access to the courts is one of the essential elements of a community based 
on the rule of law and is guaranteed in the legal order based on the EC 
Treaty (...) The Court of Justice bases the right to an effective remedy before 
a court of competent jurisdiction on the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR (...) In addition, 
the right to an effective remedy for everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has been reaffirmed by Art. 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed 
at Nice on 7 December 2000.”  
 
It is evident from the above that the right to effective judicial protection covers 
the right to a fair trial (hearing) and the right to an effective remedy as men-
tioned in Art. 6 and 13 ECHR.53 It is settled in ECHR law that the rite to access 
to a court stems from the right to a fair hearing.54 The scope of the right to 
access of a court covers different sets of rules on the administration of justice55 
including the formal restrictions on initiating procedures. It follows that 
the provisions of Community law on the conditions of intervention before 
Community courts must also correspond to the right of access to justice.  
 
 
  
 52 T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré v. Commission par. 41-42 [2002] ECR II-2365. 
 53 According to Picod the right to a judge involves both the right to access to a judge 
and the right to effective protection by a judge. Picod, F.: Le droit au juge en droit 
communautaire, 147, in Rideau, J.: Le droit au juge dans L’Union Européenne, LGDJ, 
1998.  
 54 Jacobs: The European Convention on Human Rights... op. cit. 126. 
 55 Legal aid, the need for formal authorisation to bring proceedings, immunities protecting 
certain groups, oppressive procedural requirements, practical and financial restrictions, the 
implementation of rulings; in: www.pili.org, Access to Justice in Central and Eastern Europe: 
International Standards on Access to Justice: Presentation of Jeremy McBride, University 
of Birmingham, 2003 by the Public Interest Law Initiative, Columbia University Kht, 
INTERIGHTS, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human 
Rights. 
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The Right of Access to a Court in ECHR Law with Respect to Formal 
Restrictions on Bringing Procedures 
 
Notwithstanding the scope of Art. 6(1) ECHR, the interpretation given by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to the right of access to justice 
“can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
Community law.”56 
 
Art. 6(1) declares: 
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing...” 
 
In the fundamental Golder case57 the ECtHR ruled that the principle of the rule 
of law is hardly conceivable without the possibility of access to courts. It 
continued that it is one of the universally recognised fundamental principles of 
law which must be read in the light of the principle of international law 
forbidding the denial of justice. The ECtHR considered, however, that the right 
of access to a court is not an absolute right. It stated that this right was set forth 
in the ECHR without an exact definition, therefore there is room for limitations 
permitted by implications. Nevertheless, the ECtHR rejected to give a general 
theory of admissible limitations, which meant that the ECtHR will judge the 
restrictions on this right on a case-by-case basis. 
 In Airey58 he ECtHR went further when deciding that the ECHR did not 
guarantee rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and 
effective. The ECtHR continued that this particularly applies to the right of 
access to courts, as the right to a fair trial holds a prominent place in a 
democratic society. 
 The court gave a further interpretation on the restriction of the right of access 
to courts in Ashingdane.59 The ECtHR asserted that the right of access to courts 
is not an absolute right, thus it may be subject to limitations. These limitations 
are inherent in this right, as the nature of this right provide the states a certain 
margin of appreciation to regulate access to courts, which may vary in each 
state. Nevertheless, the ECtHR concluded that these limitations must not restrict 
or reduce the access to courts in such way that the essence of the right is 
  
 56 Nold v. Commission... op. cit. par. 13.  
 57 4451/70, Golder v. The United Kingdom, Series A, No. 18. 
 58 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland, Series A, No. 32. 
 59 8225/78, Ashingdane v. The United Kingdom, Series A, No. 93. 
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violated. Moreover, the restrictions can only be upheld, if it pursues a legitimate 
aim and the principle of proportionality is respected in relation of the aims of the 
limitation and means applied.    
 
 
The Right to Access to Community Courts in Community Law with Respect 
to Formal Restrictions on Bringing Procedures 
 
In Dufay60a three month deadline for lodging a complaint under Art. 90(2) of the 
Staff Regulations was contested by the applicant on the basis of the right to a 
fair trial. The Court decided reflecting to Art. 6 ECHR that the right to a fair 
trial, which is recognised by the Community legal order, does not prohibit the 
setting of a time-limit for the institution of legal proceedings. 
 The CFI in an action for annulment launched by Christina Kik61 ruled that 
the right to a fair trial protected by Art. 6 ECHR and recognised by the 
Community judicature in the Community legal order may not be applied in the 
case, since this right cannot prohibit the application of certain criteria regarding 
admissibility set for the institution of proceedings. In Salamander62 the CFI 
decided that an action for annulment shall not be declared admissible because of 
a lack of adequate judicial protection, since this circumstance, even if proved, 
could not entitle the CFI to usurp the function of the founding authority of the 
Community in order to change the legal remedies and procedures established by 
the Treaty. 
 Although the UPA judgement63 prejudiced its influence, it is still worth 
considering the Jégo-Quéré judgement64 of the CFI. The CFI decided that the 
interpretation of individual concern–the standing condition under Art. 230(4) EC 
in actions for annulments launched by natural or legal persons–set by the Court 
in Plaumann65must be reconsidered on the basis of the right of access to courts 
and the right to an effective remedy.  
 In UPA the Court following a similar line of argument decided, however, 
that it is for the Member States to alter the current system of remedies under 
Art. 48 EU to ensure that the right of access to courts and the right to an 
  
 60 C. Dufay v. European Parliament... op. cit. par. 10.  
 61 Christina Kik v. Council... op. cit. 
 62 T-172/92, T-175/98-177/98, Salamander AG v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR 
II-2487. 
 63 UPA v. Council... op. cit. 
 64 Jégo-Quéré v. Commission... op. cit. 
 65 C-25/62, Plaumann v. Commission [1963] ECR 95. 
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effective remedy is observed in the Community system of remedies. Further-
more, the Court explicitly denied to give a new interpretation to the standing 
condition of individual concern conforming with the right to effective judicial 
protection, as such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting aside the 
condition set up in the Treaty, without violating the jurisdiction of Community 
courts.  
 It should be added that Advocates General in their opinions have con-
tinuously expressed that restrictions on bringing cases to the courts shall not 
result in a denial of justice.66   
 Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
provides:  
 
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in 
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Art. Everyone is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law.”67 
 
The updated explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights68 hold that the protection of the right to an effective remedy is more 
extensive in Union law than in ECHR law since it guarantees this right before 
a court. Referring to the jurisprudence of the Court69 the explanations point out 
that this right not only applies to the institutions of the Union, but of the 
Members States when implementing Union law. The explanations contend that 
while Art. 47 covers all rights guaranteed by Union law, it has not been intended 
to alter the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties. In connection 
with the right to a fair hearing the explanations assess that Art. 47 (2) of the 
Charter correspond to Art. 6(1) of the ECHR. It adds, however, that its scope is 
not limited to the disputes recorded in the ECHR, which is the consequence of 
the fact that Union law is based on the principle of rule of law as stated in Les 
  
 66 Among others: Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs in C-50/00 P,UPA v. Council 
[2002] ECR I-6681, in another context: Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Léger in C-224/01, 
Köbler v. Austria nyr. 
 67 See also in: Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art. II-47. 
 68 pg. 41, CONV 828/1/03 REV1, 18/07/2003; the text corresponds to the text in The 
explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
Charte 4473/00 Convent 49, 11/20/2000. 
 69 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary... op. cit., UNECTEF v. 
Heylens... op. cit., Borelli v.Commission ... op. cit. 
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Verts.70 Finally, the explanations provide that except for the limitations on the 
scope of the right the guarantees in ECHR law apply in a similar way to the 
Union. 
 
 
Carrying out the Access to Court Test / Conclusions  
 
On restrictions of the right to access to justice the ECtHR developed a test which 
provides that the restriction can be upheld, if it does not result in a denial of 
justice, and, if it is supported by a proportionate legitimate interest. In Commu-
nity law it is stated that the right to access to a justice may be restricted, 
however, it shall not constitute a denial of justice. It comes from the general 
principles of Community law that such restriction is subject to the principle of 
proportionality which is designed to resolve the conflicts between colliding 
legitimate interests. Furthermore, reflecting to Nold71 and the Explanations of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights the guidelines established in ECHR law 
should be followed in Community law.  
 It can be concluded that for scrutinising formal restrictions the Luxembourg 
and the Strasbourg courts can apply tests that contain very similar elements. It is 
evident from the above that the correspondence of the two tests is a result of 
conscious jurisprudence and lawmaking by the Community. Nevertheless, at this 
point it cannot be concluded that the tests are uniform, since the possible 
digressions in the application of the tests has not yet been discovered. However, 
it is not the task of this paper to analyse the possible functional differences, 
rather it wishes to examine whether the restrictions in question how and with 
what possible results can be brought under this basic right analysis.  
 Considering the restriction on the type of actions in which the intervention of 
any other person than the Member States and the Community institutions is 
permitted, its justification on the basis of the right of access to courts is highly 
questionable. Even tough its international public law origin is evident,72 this 
provision shall not be excluded from the requirement of the fair administration 
of justice based on fundamental rights.  
 It follows from ECHR law that it is determined on a case-by-case basis 
whether the rules on the administration of justice are in conformity with the 
right to access to a court. Therefore, below it will be considered in the first 
  
 70 Les Verts v. European Parliament... op. cit. 
 71 Nold v. Commission... op. cit. 
 72 Harlow, C.: Access to Justice as a Human Right, 193, in Alston: The EU and Human 
Rights... op. cit. 
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place, whether it is possible to put the rules on intervention in the Statute to a 
test, in which its compatibility with fundamental rights may be scrutinised.  
 The Statute of the Court of Justice is a protocol annexed to the Treaties at 
Nice, which, under Art. 311 EC, is an integral part of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, if adopted by a common accord of the Member States. It 
is evident from Art. 230 EC and Art. 234 EC–both designed to provide juris-
diction to the Community courts to review the legality of Community acts, that 
the founding treaties are not covered by them, thus the test based on funda-
mental rights could not be executed. On the other hand, it is a paradox situation 
that the review of a Council decision amending the Statute is possible under the 
same Treaty provisions. It follows that in Community law the genuine method 
of reviewing the restriction established in the Statute is in the hand of the 
Member States as political actors defining the framework of Community law.  
 Under Art. 1 of the ECHR the contracting states are responsible for all 
acts and omissions of their domestic organs allegedly violating the ECHR 
regardless of whether the act or omission in question is a consequence of 
domestic law or the obligations to comply with international obligations.73 In 
the referred case the Commission on Human Rights dismissed the application, 
as it was basically concerned the autonomous functioning of the Community, 
although based on the act of the representatives of the Member States. The 
problem of intervention, however, is more of a question of the legal framework, 
in which the Community autonomously functions, since the statute is a protocol 
annexed to the founding treaties adopted by a common accord of the Member 
States. It can be assumed that the act of the Member States creating the legal 
framework of the Community is related to the Member States as international 
actors more closely than an act of the Council, in which the Member States act 
on behalf of the Community. It follows that the act of the Member States 
adopting the Protocol of the Statue of the Court of Justice should be such act 
which they are responsible for under Art. 1 of the ECHR, thus it should be 
covered by the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.    
 It is established in ECHR law and in Community law that formal restrictions 
on access to courts may be applicable, however they may not result in a denial 
of justice. Such restriction can be upheld on the basis of a legitimate aim which 
fulfils the requirements established by the principle of proportionality. The 
restriction of the type of action in which natural or legal persons may intervene 
does not seem to establish a déni de justice, since the system of remedies in 
Community law offers other ways of judicial protection. It is relatively more 
difficult to bring forward a proportionate legitimate interest supporting the 
  
 73 13258/87, Melcher v. Germany, 64 D&R 138. 
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restriction. Since Community law established a complete system of remedies 
governed by uniform principles, a restriction based on the separation of 
remedies is far from justifiable. Moreover, considering the interpretation of the 
principle of proportionality in Community law74 an absolute ban on the applica-
tions on intervention in certain cases does not seem to satisfy the rather chiselled 
approach established by Community courts.  
 The requirement of an interest in the result of the case is another provision 
restricting the access of interveners to Community courts, therefore it shall also 
be scrutinised under the uniform test based on fundamental rights derived from 
ECHR law and Community law. It is clear that it does not call forth a denial of 
justice, since within the complete system of remedies established in Community 
law other means of judicial protection are provided. A legitimate interest under-
pinning the restriction may also be discovered, as the effectiveness of judicial 
protection requires the judiciary to function focusing on the essential and 
relevant matters in a case. The proportionality of the restriction may, however, 
be questioned on certain grounds. 
 First, it is difficult to establish a single line of interpretation concerning the 
interest in the result of the case–as it is highlighted above, since the applications 
to intervene differ in a large extent. Furthermore, in the basic line of cases the 
Community courts apply various elements in their interpretation, even though 
the basic condition of a direct and present interest in the result of the case can 
easily be revealed. The scarcely appearing requirement of a certain interest in 
the result of the case further stiffens the conditions of admissibility. Lastly, the 
here and there established postulate of being directly affected by the contested 
measure indicates that the Community courts have the opportunity to strangulate 
the access of prospective interveners to courts. It follows that the suitability 
of the restrictive condition in question is dubious, since a single line of 
interpretative elements is difficult to allocate even in the main stream of cases. 
Moreover, the diversity of the conditions of an interest in the result of the case 
shall also be reconsidered in the light of the principle of legal certainty, how-
ever, it is true that in most case the courts apply the condition of a direct and 
present interest. 
  
 74 Eg.: C-114/76, Bela-Mühle v. Grows Farm [1977] ECR 1211; C-44/79, Hauer v. 
Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727; C-181/84, R. v. Intervention Board [1985] ECR 2889; C-
331/88, R. v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex parte FEDESA [1990] ECR 
4023; C-36/75, Rutili v. Ministre de l’Intérieur [1975] ECR 1219; C-33/74, Rewe Zentrale v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649; C-41/74, Van Duyn v. Home 
Office [1974] ECR 1337; C-34/79, R. v. Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795. 
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 In the light of the fact that in certain cases75 it is rather facile to establish 
an interest in the result of the case, the overtly restrictive approach towards 
regional and local bodies which are required to prove that their economic and 
social structure essentially depends on the sector affected by the contested 
measure seems a bit out of context. Furthermore, considering that associations, 
notwithstanding their size and significance, are granted a leave to intervene in 
order to protect their members, it is difficult to appraise the fact that local or 
regional bodies are only able to intervene to protect the undertakings operating 
in their territory, if they are able to prove that they entirely and essentially 
depend on that given sector. It follows that it is worth reconsidering whether less 
restrictive means are disposable to decide upon the existence of an interest in the 
result of the case. 
 Lastly, it is necessary to examine whether it is possible to submit the judicial 
interpretation of the condition of an interest in the result of the case to the 
similar access to court tests established in ECHR law and in Community law. It 
is clear from case law that the Court of Justice considers its interpretation on a 
condition and the condition itself as a unit, whose legality under basic rights can 
only be challenged, if the condition established in a Community measure can 
be subject to a scrutiny.76 Despite the fact that other opinions77 support the 
detachment of the interpretation from the condition itself, therefore allowing a 
possible self-review of judicial interpretation, it is clear that in order to create a 
new line of interpretation of an interest in the result of the case, the condition 
itself provided in the Statute must be challenged. Furthermore, even in ECHR 
law it is not ascertained whether the fundamental rights based analysis of 
national law covers the scrutiny of judge-made law–the judicial interpretation 
of admissibility conditions established in positive law.78 It follows that on this 
matter the above explained apply.   
 
  
 75 Eg.: the administrative procedure preceding the procedure before the court was 
instrumented on the basis of the complaint of the intervener, the intervener took part in the 
administrative procedure, the intervener was closely associated with the administrative 
procedure.  
 76 UPA v. Council... op. cit. 
 77 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs in UPA... op. cit., Jégo-Quéré v. Commission... 
op. cit. 
 78 Hickman, Tom R.: The "uncertain shadow": Throwing Light on the Right to a Court 
under Art. 6(1) ECHR, 132, Public Law 2004 Spring. 
